Introduction

The Yemeni political file has witnessed a rapid movement during the past and current month after recession during the launch of Al-Aqsa Flood operation on October 7 of the last year, which has changed many regional and international files, the balance of power, and the dissuasion forces of regional parties related to the Yemeni scene.While the political file was heading to sign the roadmap announced by the UN Special Envoy to Yemen in December at the end of last year 2023, which consists of three stages according to what was leaked during those negotiations that were surrounded by a lot of secrecy even from the legitimately recognized government, which are considered one of the parties to this conflict, which in turn expressed reservations about these negotiations at the time; due to its fears about their results. What are the reasons that prompted the conflicting Yemeni parties to return to the path of negotiations? And what are the expected scenarios for this return?

Weak Humanitarian Truce

Since the success of the announcement of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Yemen, Hans Grundberg, of a two-month truce starting on April 2, 2022, and ending on June 2, 2022, with the possibility of extension. The aim of the truce was to provide a conducive environment for reaching a peaceful settlement of the conflict, issuing the presidential declaration to transfer power, and the formation of the Presidential Leadership Council five days after the announcement of the truce on April 7, 2022, according to which the Presidential Council of Eight was formed headed by Dr. Rashad Al-Alimi, who stated that he has many options for dealing with the current situation. One of the most prominent options that are consistent with the efforts made to achieve peace is to integrate into comprehensive political negotiations to end the Houthi coup against legitimacy, which took place in September 2014 when the Houthi group entered the capital Sana’a, forcing President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, his Prime Minister Khaled Bahah, a number of other ministers to be placed underhoused arrest before escaping to Aden, and declaring it the temporary capital of the country in February 2015. This event has entered the country into more conflicts and disputes, bringing it to the stage of military confrontations from the beginning when the Houthis tried to complete their control over state institutions and lands, and subject them to government. Therefore, the truce was renewed several times after the end of the two months until this moment, with several violations by the Houthis who tried several times to advance on the battlefronts to areas controlled by the legitimate government, which faced these violations on all fronts, especially in Marib, Al-Dhale’e, and Taiz fronts, which are witnessing repeated fighting from time to time until this moment. The international and regional consensus sponsoring the political process to end the Yemeni crisis was optimistic about the success of these efforts and reaching understandings between the conflicting Yemeni parties; to establish peace and begin a political process that would find a new formula that would enable the Yemenis to live peacefully together and move forward in building the new country according to the three references. But the Houthis have found a way out once again to slip away from their commitment to the obligations resulting from signing the roadmap by entering the confrontation line in the Red Sea on the plea of supporting the Palestinian resistance that has been going to war with the Zionist enemy since the start of Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, which the Houthi group realized as having gained the support of the Yemeni street with such a step, and was also able to enhance its human capabilities with campaigns to mobilize new recruits in its lines under the same justification (fighting America and Israel and supporting Al-Aqsa Mosque). It also found an opportunity to make its voice heard abroad and try to impose itself on the regional and international scene as an actor that cannot be ignored at any future stage.

What are the reasons that prompted the conflicting Yemeni parties to return to the negotiations path?

Each party has influences and factors that pushed it to return to negotiations path after each party found the paths are blocked to a military solution. We can review these reasons for each party as follows:

1. The First Party (The Legitimate Government):

From the beginning, the legitimate government had concerns about the negotiations path, which it considered unclear, since it did not participate in them directly. Some parties have expressed their dissatisfaction with the way it was treated by the sponsors of these peace efforts, since it is the internationally recognized government and the first responsible before the Yemeni people for all possible results in the end. However, at the same time, it welcomed these efforts for several reasons: The most of these are the pressures it is exposed to from the office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the leadership of the Arab coalition, which were the most prominent sponsors of these negotiations, or who drafted them, even if there is no official confirmation according to what some of the parties participating in the legitimacy consider, which also did not find a formula of agreement between it and the rest of the partners in the Yemeni legitimacy formed at the beginning of 2022, and the Government’s economic burden caused by war by Houthi group on the economy in areas controlled by the government in several ways, the most one is striking the oil export ports in Hadhramout and Shabwa in October 2022 after talking about the failure to extend the truce, other successive measures taken by the Houthis to pressure the legitimacy, to put it in the face of economic difficulties that would weaken it, and achieve gains in front of it after the failure of military operations to resolve in their favor, and ending with the process of coin minting of one hundred riyals when the governor of the central bank affiliated with the Houthi group, Hashem Ismail, announced the issuance of a metal coin of 100 riyals, which began to be circulated starting from the 21st of Ramadan 1445 Hijri corresponding to March 31, 2024, which the legitimate government considered an attempt to divide the Yemeni economy, and this escalation by the Houthis cannot be accepted. It was necessary to confront it with strict economic decisions, so the Central Bank of Aden has issued several decisions that had positive results in weakening the Houthis in the economic file, which is supported by the reactions made by the Houthis after the decisions of the Central Bank of Aden. The past months have witnessed escalations by both parties in using economic tools against each other, sometimes as an initial action, and sometimes as a reaction to what the other party is doing, until the situation reached what it is in the areas controlled by the legitimate government, with the deterioration of citizens’ living conditions, the collapse of the local currency (Riyal) against foreign currencies, and the increasing demands of the street for the government to put an end to this poor living conditions and the continuous collapse of the local currency, especially since there is financial and administrative corruption attacking the institutions of the legitimate government that has also contributed to the deterioration of services, and the use of this file in internal conflicts by partners, to try to defeat each other without taking into account the damages resulting from the lives of citizens. The importance of the sensitive stage that requires alignment by everyone to confront the Houthi threat and stay away from everything that could cause cracks in the internal front, for which the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission was established, in conjunction with the presidential announcement to form the Presidential Leadership Council. This commission is supposed to play this role in bringing the viewpoints of all the partners of legitimacy closer together, and unifying the lines to confront the Houthis and end their coup against legitimacy. The legitimate government’s acceptance of the negotiation process, while continuing to have reservations about some files, came after a clear hesitation in sending its delegation to the Omani capital; Muscat, and the apology of the representative of the National Army in the government delegation for joining the delegation and expressing his objecting to go to this round, explaining that he would not participate in any upcoming round, before allowing visits to the forcibly disappeared, headed by Professor Mohammed Qahtan, and stopping the Houthi death sentences, in addition to stopping the Houthi kidnapping campaigns against civilians in areas under its control. In the same context, the head of the Supreme Authority of the Yemeni Islah Party, Mohammed Al-Yadoumi, tweeted on X platform on July 4, in which he hoped that the legitimacy would have someone to represent it in these negotiations. This raised a lot of noise over the legitimate government’s negotiating delegation, indicating the lack of consensus between the main partners in it. Although the declared goal of these negotiations was humanitarian regarding the prisoners, but the observer knows that it is not, especially after the announcement by Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal Bin Farhan that the roadmap to resolve the Yemeni crisis is ready and we are ready to work according to it.

2. The Second Party (Houthi Group):

The Houthis wanted to preserve what they consider to be the gains made over the past period, especially on the political level as a de facto government in the north of Yemen and to emerge from the economic crisis that the areas under their control are suffering from, and the growing state of frustration among citizens after the failure to complete their control over all of Yemen’s territory through military action that has encountered strong resistance on several fronts. The group has begun to suffer from achieving any progress on these fronts, or achieving breakthroughs within the areas controlled by the legitimate government, using the various methods it used to operate with, and they have become clear and exposed to the other party, which has found solutions to confront and expose them more easily than they were in the beginning. The Houthis – re-designated by the US administration as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist group” (SDGT) amid continued attacks by the Yemen-based militia, Biden’s administration had removed the Houthis’ designation as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” (SDGT) and canceled their designation as a foreign terrorist organization in February 2021, after the Trump’s administration had designated them in its final weeks – have resorted to accepting a round of negotiations to ease the internal pressures they are suffering in areas under their control. And also to try to find a solution to the crisis that has become a big problem for them after the internationally recognized legitimate government moved to use economic tools to confront them at the beginning of April 2024, starting with Resolution No. (17) of 2024 regarding the transfer of the main centers of commercial banks, Islamic banks and microfinance banks from Sana’a city to the temporary capital of Aden, and other successive decisions that followed after the end of the two-month deadline specified in this resolution. The Ministry of telecommunications and Information Technology in the temporary capital of Aden, has instructed the mobile phone companies operating in Sana’a to transfer their headquarters technically, administratively and financially to the temporary capital of Aden, and to correct the status of the companies urgently. The Minister of Transport also instructed the Yemenia Airlines Company to transfer all the company’s revenues to its bank accounts in the temporary capital of Aden or abroad, especially after the Houthi group seized its balances in Sana’a banks, which exceed $100 million, and to enable the company to provide the company’s operating budget and to develop and modernize its fleet. The Ministry of Transport in the legitimate government (internationally recognized) called on all travel agencies accredited in the areas under the control of the Houthi group to move to the governorates affiliated with the legitimate government to carry out their activities. The Houthi group boiled over after all these pressures, which is evident in the actions it took, starting with a wide-scale campaign of arrests of UN, civil society employees and former employees of the US embassy in Yemen, accusing and issuing sentences against them, and to holding in custody three Yemenia Airlines planes at Sana’a airport with their navigational and technical crews, preventing their return to complete the transfer of stranded Yemeni pilgrims in the holy lands. The areas under its control have witnessed a military operation by the multinational Prosperity Protection Alliance, which was formed in December 2023 at the initiative of the United States, to protect international shipping routes and reassure global shipping companies and sailors after the Houthi group carried out attacks against some ships that, according to them, belong to the Israeli enemy and its allies passing through the Red Sea and Bab Al-Mandab Strait, concurrently with the continuation of Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, in which the Houthi group confirmed the cessation of its operations in the Red Sea, as the escalation was linked to the state of war in Gaza. The Houthis has realized that Muscat round of negotiations was a golden opportunity to reach an agreement that would get them out of all the critical situations they were suffering from internally and externally on the political, economic and military levels after the failure of the Houthi lobby, which the group had been quickly trying to plant everywhere, especially in the corridors of the United Nations, the European Union, foreign embassies, international organizations and funds, according to some reports during the war periods, to achieve successes by showing the group as a group that bears the grievances of a minority oppressed by the previous ruling regimes in Yemen.

 :Outcomes

All parties have pursued to possess pressure cards before returning to the negotiation path to achieve satisfactory results for their benefit, and this pursuit was clearly hot during the past period before the start of Muscat round at the end of June under the auspices of the office of the UN envoy to Yemen, Hans Grundberg, and the International Committee of the Red Cross, in which there was great hope to reach an agreement between the participants regarding the file of prisoners, kidnappers, and forcibly disappeared persons, as declared, but what was hidden, according to what we mentioned previously in this paper, was that the negotiations were expected to prepare for the emergence of a mechanism or understandings to sign an agreement leading to peace and the start of a political process according to the roadmap announced by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the end of last year, 2023. The parties have begun discussions according to the announced agenda for this round, but the sponsors found some obstacles that prevented reaching real results, contrary to what was coming out of statements about achieving a breakthrough in some files, and at other times reaching understandings about the lists of prisoners and forcibly disappeared persons. But the facts quickly became clear at the end of this round without any real touchable results that were supposed to be presented at its conclusion, except for the success in convincing the Houthi group to release the Yemenia Airlines planes that had been detained earlier at Sana’a airport. The shocking thing is what happened after the end of the negotiation round on July 7, when the Special Envoy’s office sent a letter to the President of the Presidential Leadership Council; Rashad Al-Alimi, to freeze the decisions of the Central Bank in Aden until the end of August, to take back the licenses of six commercial banks, for not responding to the transfer of their headquarters to the temporary capital of Aden, explaining that these decisions would have repercussions on the Yemeni economy and would damage the livelihood of ordinary Yemenis, and could lead to the risk of military escalation. He called for a new round after two months, forgetting the risks of the Central Bank in Aden taking back its decisions, since the declare of “President of the Leadership Council” that he had received the message from the “Office of the UN Envoy,” and the Yemeni street flaming, and the anger quickly turned into hashtags, popular demonstrations, and events in a number of governorates, resulting in a strong statement being issued to the political parties, which observers considered a threatening Houthi speech to the government from the Office of the UN Envoy. The Yemeni parties also have requested the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, to evaluate the “actions” of the UN envoy, Hans Grundberg, after putting pressure on the legitimate government to withdraw the recent decisions of the Central Bank, and his clear differences in dealing with the Yemeni file, and the taking sides that appears for the Houthi group against legitimacy, such as his silence on the violations committed by the Houthi group against the banking sector, which reached the point of arresting the administrative leaders of some private banks, appointing administrations loyal to them, preventing the circulation of the new edition of the national currency, and creating a situation of economic division in remembrance of what the former UN envoy, Martin Griffiths, did to save the Houthi group from losing Hodeidah city when the national army forces were close to controlling and liberating it on December 13, 2018. Hans Grundberg, here is returning to save this militia from collapsing in the face of the decisions of the Central Bank in Aden. Therefore, it seems that the Presidential Council of Eight responded to the request of the UN envoy’s office and submitted to international and regional pressures that do not want the return of military fights between the parties, without any consideration for what the Yemeni people are suffering from, and the legal status of the country, which has become a matter of doubt in the street today, while observers did not see any fall back by the Houthi group, or practicing pressures against it by the UN envoy’s office, or the international quartet like those that the legitimacy was exposed to, but rather the group’s media discourse escalated against the leader of the Arab coalition, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, until the group’s leader came out in a recorded speech broadcast by media affiliated with the group on July 7, 2024, threatening the Kingdom with a return to military escalation if the Central Bank of Yemen does not back down from its decisions, as it is the supporter of legitimacy and its sponsor. The group’s leader has indicated that the treatment would be similar by striking banks, airports and ports inside Saudi territory, accusing them of implementing an American agenda, which increased pressure on the internationally recognized legitimate government to freeze with one voice decision holding No. (31) to suspend the licenses of a number of exchange companies and facilities issued on July 10, 2024 in an emergency meeting of the council members on July 12, showing approval to engage in negotiations, on condition that “the existence of a clear agenda for any dialogue on the economic file, including resuming oil exports, unifying the national currency, and canceling arbitrary measures against the banking sector,” which made the governor of the Central Bank of Yemen to submit a resignation request to the President of the Presidential Leadership Council and the rest of the council members urgently and secretly according to the leaked letter on July 17 in response to what the council is doing in terms of making concessions to the Houthi militia and responding to external pressures. In the context of the Houthi group’s plan to escape from the increasing internal popular pressures against the group in the areas under its control, the group went to increase the military escalation by adopting the strike on Tel Aviv in the Zionist entity with a drone on July 18, which require the Zionist entity to respond in kind by launching a large-scale bombing of civilian targets and facilities in the port of Hodeidah and the power station near the port two days later on July 20, which the Yemeni forces considered a violation of the country’s sovereignty, and most Yemeni parties, even those hostile to the Houthi group, have condemned it; because of the great damage it has caused to the lives of citizens, and the increase in living conditions in those areas above what they were already suffering from. The Houthi group remains determined to engage the country in internal and external crises by committing foolishness and military adventures if the Yemeni file is not dealt with seriously by the Yemeni parties, the UN and regional sponsors, which speed up the political movement in the corridors of the International Quartet until a statement was issued by the office of the UN Special Envoy to Yemen on July 23 to reach an agreement between the Yemeni parties on several measures to reduce escalation regarding the banking sector and Yemeni Airlines according to a written text received by the UN envoy from the two parties of 4 terms. The question remains about the existence of guarantees on various (political, economic and military) aspects provided by the sponsors to the conflicting Yemeni parties to achieve the terms of this agreement and its cohesion so that its fate does not be like its predecessor.

Scenarios:

1) Stop the War & Relieve the Pressure:

Each party will continue to set conditions and request advance guarantees to continue participating in the upcoming rounds of negotiations, which the other party sees as impossible conditions, which will keep the situation as it is, especially with the upcoming election battle in America and the continuation of Israel’s war against the Palestinian people, which are factors affecting the Yemeni file, and that the Houthi group excels at more than the legitimate government, due to the lack of real regional and international pressure on it to commit to the negotiation process, as it has previously slipped away many rounds, and even implementing items agreed upon in previous rounds, and the ability to end the internal pressures exerted by citizens in areas under their control by tightening the security grip on them, and threatening to arrest them and issue rulings against them.

2) Continuing Engagement in The Negotiation Process:

The conflicting parties are trying to find solutions to get out of the internal pressures and the deterioration of living conditions in the areas they control, to reduce the intensity of the increasing economic conflict between them, and their submission to the pressures of the UN envoy’s office and the countries of the region that have come to realize the damage of the continued failure to reach a stable situation in Yemen on their national security. These parties believe that the negotiation path could be a safe way out for them without further damage, while preserving their previous gains, especially the Houthi group that seeks to achieve recognition of its legitimacy as a de facto government for the areas it controls, as well as the legitimate government by restoring the export of oil extracted from its areas that has been stopped since the Houthis struck the export ports, as we mentioned previously.

3) Breakdown of the Negotiation Process & Return of Military Escalation:

This is the costliest scenario for all parties and their supporters, especially since during the past period they have been trying not to return to violent military escalation as before after it failed to achieve its goal over 10 years of battles and material losses that drained them. The legitimate government has found that the economic escalation against the Houthi group had positive results, which it prefers, but it is also gathering its military units to be ready for any development resulting from the collapse of the negotiation process. The Houthi fronts have also witnessed intensive gathering attempts in the past months in anticipation of the same scenario, with everyone preferring to use the mobilization as a pressure card without returning to military operations.