Introduction

The visit of the president of the Presidential Leadership Council; Dr. Rashad Al-Alimi came on his second visit to Hadhramout Governorate on July 27, 2024, with the Council members; Dr. Abdullah Al-Alimi and Sheikh Othman Majli, in light of the tension increasing in the governorate due to the deterioration of living conditions, the collapse of the public services system, the continued collapse of the local currency against foreign currencies, the suspension of the educational process since the second semester of last year, as well as many new conditions in the Yemeni crisis file. The first visit was on June 24, 2023, since the announcement of the formation of the Presidential Council in April 2022. The President and the Council members have held meetings with the local authority leaders, the Executive Office, military and security leaders, political, social and media persons, and NGOs representatives.

 In light of reaching an agreement to de-escalate the situation regarding the banking sector and Yemeni Airlines between the internationally recognized legitimate government and the Houthi group on July 23, 2024, under the auspices of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and returning to the negotiation track, and renewing the roadmap in which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the leader of the Arab coalition played a major role. In light of the tension between the local authority in the governorate and some social components that have increased their level of escalation against the policies of the Governor; Mabkhout Bin Madi and the central government as announced in its statements, the most distinct one was Inclusive Hadhramout Conference and Hadhramout Tribes confederacy.

The Sequence 

Since the Yemeni consultations have been held with the participation of about 500 people from various components of Yemeni society hosted by Riyadh, and sponsored by Gulf Cooperation Council during the period between March 29 and April 7, 2022, which ended with the decree of President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, President of the Republic of Yemen, No. (9) regarding the formation of the Presidential Leadership Council, to manage the country politically, militarily and security during the transitional period, and to authorize to it the full powers of the President of the Republic, headed by Dr. Rashad Al-Alimi and 7 other members. Hadhramout has participated with a common delegation (Inclusive Hadhramout Conference, Hadhramout Tribes Confederacy, and Arbitration of Hadhramout Tribes) consisting of 8 members headed by Sheikh Abdullah Bin Saleh Al-Kathiri; head of Arbitration of Hadhramaut Tribes, as well as the local authority of the governorate represented by the governor at that time; Major General Faraj Salmeen Al-Bahsani, the commander of the Second Military Region, who later became a member of the declared Presidential Leadership Council, and parliament & Shura Hadhrami members. The people of the governorate pleased with this representation and participation, which they considered a positive step towards their involvement in the new and sensitive phase, and ending the era of exclusion and marginalization that they suffered from the successive regimes in Hadhramout since 1967, but this feeling quickly vanished after the return of the tensions that had hit the governorate before, and it even entered a new phase, perhaps the most prominent one is the escalation of the power struggle represented by the newly appointed governor, Mabkhout Bin Madi, on 31st of July, 2022, and the former governor and commander of the Second Military Region, Major General Faraj Salmeen Al-Bahsani; member of the Presidential Council, these tensions have been reflected in many important files within the governorate, which witnessed an obstruction in their completion, until the Houthi group’s strike on Al-Dabbah port in October 2022, which the governorate has taken away from its share of 20% of crude oil sales. The Governor of Hadhramout; Mr. Mabkhout Mubarak Bin Madi, has issued decree No. 51 of the year 2023, regarding the formation of a committee to unify viewpoints between the components and forces in Hadhramout Governorate on March 16, 2023, in an attempt to use soft tools in the ongoing conflict. The conflict intensified at some stages to the point of approaching the use of rough tools – a scenario drawn up to drag the governorate into carrying out armed conflicts – which was rejected by all the people of the governorate and their components due to their nature, which tends towards peace and dialogue more than their tendency to engage in armed conflicts. The most remarkable chapters of this incident are Balfaqih Center, which is considered the headquarters of the local authority and is close to the Public Palace in Mukalla at the end of March 2023. Members of the First Presidential Protection Brigade, which was involved in the aforementioned Balfaqih Center incident, were also subjected to hitting in front of the gate of the Rabwa Khalaf camp, as well as accompanying violations of one of the security campaigns against the residents of the neighborhoods of Mukalla city. which has confirmed by the statement of Hadhramout Tribes confederacy dated October 29, 2023, which mentioned in Item (3) the United Arab Emirates as one of the parties to the conflict of influence in coastal Hadhramout, supporting a special political agenda and imposing it with money and force of arms on the Hadhrami community.

    Al-Bahsani’s response was in the context of using soft tools after all Hadhramis refused to use hard tools by joining the Transitional Council as deputy to its president; Major General Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, after the end of the Southern Dialogue in Aden at the beginning of May 2023. The 6th session of the National Assembly of the Transitional Council was held in Mukalla city, which was called by the President of the Southern Transitional Council; Major General Aidarous Al-Zubaidi from May 21 to 22, 2023. Al-Zubaidi arrived in the city days before the National Assembly meeting, on a military vehicle (armored car), and parade the Transitional Council’s military force coming by land from Aden, In conjunction with calls to invade Hadhramout by activists follower the Transitional Council, which some Hadhramis considered an irritation to them, that required holding a meeting in Seiyun (Seiyun Statement) for the rejecting components on May 18, 2023. These participating forces are the core of Hadramout National Council, a political carrier of Hadrami society aspirations, which come out from the Hadrami consultations hosted by Riyadh, the capital of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for a month from 5/20 to 6/20 in coordination with Governor; Mabkhout Bin Madi. This has considered a clear entry of the coalition leader into the conflict of influence within the governorate, which considered an extension of its national security, as the National Council came to meet the urgent need of the Hadrami field to unify lines and efforts to come out with a clear vision, and it received broad support from all parties, forces and political and social components inside Hadhramout, except the Southern Transitional Council, which considered it a threat to its project to restore the southern state before 1990.

The first visit of the President of the Presidential Leadership Council; Dr. Rashad Al-Alimi to Hadhramout on June 24, 2023, which was scheduled for a few months ago, but due to certain circumstances it was postponed more than once with Saudi Program delegation for the development and reconstruction of Yemen, and a number of senior ministers and officials in the state, whose presence confirms the importance of the visit, especially in terms of the diversity of names, which makes the delegation more comprehensive and representative. Some had hoped that after the Council’s President; Dr. Rashad Al-Alimi has stated in the general expanded meeting with the local authority leaders, security and military leaders, social and public persons, NGOs, the women’s sector and youth on June 25, 2023 that “Hadhramout will manage itself completely financially, administratively, and security by the local authority,”. This statement was supposed to be followed by practical steps by the central authority and the local authority to implement this decision on the ground, and to make Hadhramout a model for not enshrining the centralization that led to the situation we are in today. However, the local authority has adopted a new approach in its management of the governorate’s affairs after this statement, contrary to what the forces, components and parties inside Hadhramout have realized as single decisions and appointments, and dropping and removing of others, which negatively affected the relationship of the local authority with the parties, components and other forces, which did not stop their repeated demands in many events and occasions for the governor to find a partnership that would guarantee everyone’s participation in managing the governorate’s affairs, and not to drop or remove them in representation within the various governorate agencies. In this context, the Governor; Bin Madi took the decision to stop transferring the governorate’s revenues to the Central Bank in Aden to fulfill service obligations towards citizens at the end of November 2023, but he amended the decision after only two weeks. Bin Madi has linked his decision amendment to the government’s implementation of the demands that were previously submitted, especially Hadhramout’s legitimate demands regarding the governorate’s share and some other demands.

Among the popular movements is the announcement of the Preparatory Committee for the Unified Council of the Eastern Governorates on January 9, 2024, at a conference held in Seiyun in Wadi Hadhramout, to raise the demanding to declare regions of Hadhramaut, Shabwa, Al-Mahrah and Socotra in accordance with the outcomes of the comprehensive national dialogue 2013, and the fair partnership of the people of the four governorates in managing the state and distributing wealth with all other national forces, therefore, demands are increasing for the central government, represented by the Presidential Leadership Council, and the local authority in the governorate to participate in management, be fair in representing, and be transparent in disclosing the governorate’s revenues and expenditures. In light of the slow implementation of these demands by the local authority, and the return of the legitimacy and the Houthi group to the negotiation path through Muscat Round at the end of June and the beginning of July 2024. Talking about returning to the roadmap, preparing for signing by the concerned parties, and reaching an agreement on several measures to reduce escalation regarding the economic aspect between the legitimate government and the Houthi group at the end of July, as we mentioned previously in this paper. The Hadhrami people have seen that the talk is about their oil wealth, and bargaining over it between those parties without Hadhramout having any significant word, or a share matches with the needs of the governorate, which are increasing day after day for many reasons. All of this inflamed the people of the governorate with their various orientations, and they have imagined the return of the scenario of robbery their wealth and capabilities by the previous regimes, which prompted them to gather themselves to stand against the scenario of robbery. But this time, suddenly and individually, Inclusive Hadhramout Conference has issued a statement about the important extraordinary meeting of the leadership of the organizational frameworks on June 13, 2024, which confirmed all the previous demands of all parties, forces and components in addition to what was stated in its item (7) “giving the leadership of the local authority a period of (30) days to implement what the abovementioned, The Presidential Leadership Council and the government must take the necessary measures to correct the disturbed situation, unless the people of Hadhramout will announce painful measures that will begin and will not end until the injustice against the people of Hadhramout is lifted, and they impose their right to their land and wealth.” This is an escalation that has increased the state of tension between the central and local authorities, and Inclusive Hadhrami in particular, which speed up the second visit of the President of the Presidential Leadership Council, with the two members of the Council; Dr. Abdullah Al-Alimi and Sheikh Othman Majli, to Mukalla city; the capital of Hadhramout, on July 27, 2024, which is rejected by Inclusive Hadhramout in a statement published one day before the arrival of the President of the Council, on July 26, 2024. The Inclusive Hadhramout has published a press release regarding the performance of Hadhramaut’s Governor; Mr. Mabkhout Mubarak Bin Madi, on July 30, while Amr Bin Habrish Al-Ali; head of Hadhramaut Tribes Confederacy and the first deputy governor suddenly escalated. As stated in the statement issued by the unusual meeting of the leaders and symbols of Hadhramout Tribes Confederacy, held in Hadhramout highland; Al-Oleeb area, the camp site established by head of Hadhramout Tribes Confederacy after he left Mukalla city on July 31, 2024, after emphasizing the items mentioned in the statement of the Inclusive on July 13, in the middle of the same month, Item (5) of the statement stated, “In the event of no response to what was mentioned within a period of 48 hours, we will seize the land and wealth,” which made the situation more difficult than before. Despite the precaution of the rest of the forces and components regarding what was stated in item (2), considering that the statement of the confederacy, which is considered the military wing of Inclusive Hadhramout Conference, attempted to jump upon the agreement that existed between it and the rest of the components and forces by attempting to impose Inclusive Hadhramout Conference as the only representative of the rights and demands of Hadhramaut and to exclude the rest, this statement has been supported by many forces, who came together to the location of camp confederacy, as they have seen that it serves the public interest of the people of the governorate. The short deadline set by confederacy of (48) hours have ended, and the central government and the local authority did not respond to the demands, which prompted the confederacy to sit up military checkpoints around the areas of companies operating in oil extraction in a move to prevent any shipments from leaving the governorate, and they have confirmed that there would be a subsequent escalation, which is still ongoing. Dr. Rashad Al-Alimi has concluded his visit to Hadhramout, and predictions remain about the motives behind the visit, and what the consequences of events will be in the future?

Visit’s Motives

By analyzing the context and timing of the visit, the speeches of the President and his deputies during the meetings he held, and his field visits, the motives for the visit can be concluded in the following:

1– Proving the presence of the Presidential Council & the local authority support

It was clear from the timing of the visit, especially in light of the increasing popular discontent with the Presidential Council after it backed down from the decrees issued by the Central Bank in Aden in its battle against the Houthi group to chasten in the economic file, the attempt to separate the economic aspect into two, and misuse with it by taking a series of measures that caused a lot of damage to the country’s economy, and clamping down on the legitimate government by targeting sources of revenue at several levels in previous periods of time without any noteworthy reactions from the government and the Presidential Council. Until the recent decisions of the Central Bank came to stop the Houthi mess, and stand against it with a package of successive decisions that showed positive results made the Houthi return to the square of threats to the government, and to the leadership of the Arab coalition to pressure towards stopping the escalation, which was announced by the office of the UN envoy for this agreement, which shook the legitimacy of the Presidential Leadership Council among the Yemeni people. It was necessary for the Council’s President and his deputies to move to prove his presence and his chances again, and that he was still present and had not completely left the game. As for the local authority, the head of the Presidential Leadership Council was racing against time to save the governor and his authority from the increasing tension against him day after day, and to find a way out of this problem, and to resolve the differences so that they would not grow in the face of the local authority, which was specifically supported by the head of the Leadership Council – whose presence was limited to visits and official and governmental meetings coordinated by the local authority – in the future due to Bin Madi’s failure to create consensus, stability and real development in the governorate. Rather, he went too far in his single decisions and appointments that upset the forces in Hadhramout. Unlike Dr. Abdullah Al-Alimi, who did not show his support for the local authority and the implications of that, his speech was considered a blame and dissatisfaction with the policy of the governor’s authority in his speech before the executive office of the governorate, and through visits to some persons and symbols outside the authority and some other forces at the same time as the meetings and visits of the head of the council, and taking a neutral position regarding the internal conflict between the leadership of the local authority, the leadership of Inclusive Hadhramout Conference, and Hadhramout Tribes Confederacy.

2– Arranging for re-export of the stopped oil

It was clear to the observer of the Yemeni scene in the past few months that the use of economic tools in the war between the Yemeni legitimacy and the Houthi group has escalated after their failure to achieve a military solution, the worsening of the humanitarian crisis due to prolong the war, the acceleration of talk about revenues and resources, and the possibility to play an important role in creating gathering and understanding between the conflicting parties and restoring life to the Yemeni people who have been exhausted by difficult living conditions. But unfortunately, some sources leaked about submitting Hadhramout oil on the negotiating table behind closed doors, and the demands made in this regard by some parties as a solution to overcome the challenges and difficulties they face in finding sources to support the budget with what the governorate experiencing from stopping the wheel of development and disrupting the use of its resources.

3- Power Struggleing

There is a power struggle taking place between the two leaders of Arab coalition leadership to support legitimacy, and this struggle is no longer hidden from anyone, but recently this struggle has increased and the methods and tools used to resolve it have diversified. Hadhramout was not excluded from all of this, as the timing of the first visit was a clear case in that conflict when it coincided with the meeting of the Southern National Assembly, and the hosting of its opponents in Riyadh, leading to the announcement of Hadhramout National Council, and concluding with Al-Alimi’s visit to Hadhramout accompanied by current and former high-level Hadhrami persons, and a delegation from The Saudi Development & Reconstruction Program for Yemen. The visit has concluded with groundbreaking for many vital development projects and launching (20) projects, at a cost of more than (266.6) million dollars (1.2) billion Saudi riyals. There was another aspect to this conflict using military tools, perhaps the most prominent one was the announcement of the formation of Nation Shield Brigades under the leadership of Rashad Al-Alimi with the support of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to be parallel to the security services, the southern forces and others formed by the Emirates to help it in the struggle for influence that it noticed early on and prepared for in advance. As for Hadhramaut’s share of that harsh conflict, it was divided into a coast under the control of Emirates, and a valley under the control of Saudi Arabia. The situation remained the same until fears began on both sides of the other party’s expansion into its areas of presence, so this file moved more quickly. The entry of Barashid Brigade located in Mukalla after its liberation from the terrorist elements of Al-Qaeda by the Hadrami Elite, and the increase in its members at the expense of weakening the elite over time by their entry sometimes in the form of military convoys, and sometimes in the form of civilian elements, and using Al-Rayyan Airport and Al-Dhabah Port as operations centers and residences for Emirati officers and individuals to manage the military and security file on Hadhramout coast, and to impose complete control over it, which required the Kingdom to move in this file, as we mentioned previously, by forming Nation Shield Brigades and training large numbers of the governorate’s sons within them in Al-Aber border area of Saudi Arabia, and trying to redeploy them in Hadhramout to manage the military file. But that was met with a sharp Emirati rejection, and the incident of refusing to allow these forces to enter Hadhramout coastal areas at the beginning of this year 2024 is clear evidence, even though the orders came to allow them to pass and locate based on a telegram from the head of the security committee; the Governor Mabkhout Bin Madi. Rashad Al-Alimi’s second visit doesn’t have implications of that conflict when the son of Hadhramout, Major General Faraj Al-Bahsani, a member of the Presidential Council and Vice President of Southern Transitional Council, was repeatedly absent from this visit, and the present of two members of the Presidential Council; Dr. Abdullah Al-Alimi and Othman Majali, who are closer to the Kingdom than to the Emirates.

The Visit’s Consequences

 This visit has produced many differences at the local and central levels and it’s still ongoing. By following these differences, we can read the consequences of the visit.

1- Continued tension and the possibility of armed clashes

Things may go to a limited armed clash, and it may develop into widespread clashes between the members of the confederacy gathered on the highland – many of the persons and tribes arbitrations that established Hadhramout Tribes confederacy are failure to attend this time – and the tribal groups in support of the confederacy ‘s steps on a daily basis, and members of the military formations present in the same geographical area. What supports this is the increasing state of tension after the end of the specified deadline and the spread of confederacy security checkpoints in some locations, especially around the oil production fields, in an escalation that indicates the confederacy has not backed down from the steps it has taken. It believes that backing down from it will cause a lot of losses in terms of popular support, and the loss of its societal influence in the governorate, and the confederacy will invite parties and forces to participate in its escalation program for the first time to get closer and attempts to gather them to its side. At the same time, there are still ongoing tribal mediations, whether independent or supported by active parties in the Yemeni file to bring viewpoints closer together, come up with solutions that satisfy the parties, and defuse the crisis between them. On the other hand, it cannot be taken away existing groups or persons pushing those parties to armed conflict to serve their interests in an agreement is reached to end this tension.

2-Resolving Some Differences

It is possible to contribute to resolving these differences by the central and local authorities adopting a period of priority projects, such as electricity and some other service aspects, and starting them quickly as an initiative to build confidence among the people of the governorate, so that the crisis can be taken to pieces little by little, such as the Council president’s announcement to establish two power plants in Hadhramout Governorate with a capacity of 100MW, and reassuring the Hadhrami people by issuing some other decisions to enable the governorate to manage its affairs urgently, not to delaying in fulfilling previous and current promises, nonalignment with the authority despite its previous poor model in managing the governorate and its resources, and its noticeable failure and excuse to stop the 20% share of oil sales despite there are other resources in the governorate that are much greater than the oil share, and the corruption surrounding the resources file in the lack of transparency in revealing their size and methods of disposing of them. It may be a step that changing the governorate’s management with competencies that represent everyone and agreed upon contributes to resolving these differences, especially since it is accused of drowning in corruption and lacks experience and competence in management. This is supported by the speech of the member of the Leadership Council; Dr. Abdullah Al-Alimi, in the meeting with the governorate’s executive office, which was considered a clear scolding of the local authority’s approach when he said, “The local authority should not be subject to politics, polarization, or sharing.” its mission is to look after the interests of all the people of the governorate from all parties, and this matter should be forgotten, and no type of political exclusion can be accepted or practiced against anyone based on his political orientation except by the governor or the general manager. In addition, the Kingdom hosts the Presidency of Hadhramout National Council, which may participate in the National Council, within certain arrangements in managing the governorate or supervising and monitoring the performance of the governorate’s executive authority.

3-Loss of Escalation Efforts

In case of the forces and components opposing the central and local government policy do not agree to organize their lines quickly, studying developments and proposing solutions for them, using different methods to seize the rights that demands, or some persons climbed that escalation to obtain personal gains without considering the risks of this climb in the short and long term for the rights of the people of the governorate, or the continuation of individual case led by Inclusive Hadhramout Conference, Hadhramout Tribes Confederacy and its leaders, due to its negative effects on the cohesion of forces and components against anyone who tries to misuse with Hadhramout’s resources and wealth, excluding its role, and removing its sons in the future. Especially since the central and local government play on the time factor, which is in its favor the longer it lasts. Unlike other forces that can become bored and desperate over time, and lose confidence in the leadership, in the usefulness of their continued escalation, the repeated failure of those attempts many times, and what supports this is the call of Governor; Mabkhout Bin Madi for an expanded meeting of the groups and components of Hadhramout calling for unifying the word, unifying the lines to obtain the rights of Hadhramout to get closer and line up around it in light of the continued escalation of the Confederacy.

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