Executive Summary:

September has ended with a new situation in the Yemeni war. The Houthi group achieved its biggest territorial gain in years when it took control of Mokha, its port, and a coastal strip near Bab Al-Mandab Strait. It then shifted the pressure into Saudi territory with attacks reaching the outskirts of Riyadh and Al-Taif. In response, the government lost significant territory but launched a widespread war of attrition and secured the most substantial regional and international support since the 2022 ceasefire.

On the political level, the government’s speech shifted within a few weeks from confidence to justifying the loss and then to general mobilization. The proliferation of official accounts regarding the fall of Mokha revealed that the anti-Houthi camp lacks a unified narrative of what happened. In Washington, a dual approach emerged. While Congress called for dismantling the group’s network, the U.S. administration confirmed direct communication with it and limited its support to intelligence assistance for Saudi Arabia without participating in the airstrikes.

Civilians paid the heaviest price. According to an official report, the number of newly displaced people exceeded 180,000, and displacement by sea to Djibouti resumed; the Minister of Health warned of a collapse of services in the affected areas. Economically, the situation in the liberated areas remained dependent on Saudi support amid a halt in oil exports, while the group raised fuel prices in its areas by as much as 21 percent. The casualty figures announced this month must be treated with caution, as most were reported by the warring parties themselves and cannot be independently verified.

The question remains: where are things headed? All indicators through the end of the month suggest that the escalation has not yet reached its peak. General mobilization has been declared, and the army’s strikes are expanding to cover most fronts and deep into the group’s strongholds, while the Houthi group is sending new reinforcements to Kahbub, Taiz, and Marib. However, three factors limit the possibility of a decisive outcome. First, Washington has not decided to participate in the offensive. Second, the government has not yet recaptured any of the positions it lost along the coast. Third, the cohesion of the forces opposing the Houthis has been called into question following the events in Mokha and Al-Dhale’.

The UN envoy summed up the difficulty when he said that the solution hinges on separating the war in Yemen from the region’s other conflicts. Therefore, talk of an imminent decisive battle is closer to mobilization rhetoric than to a confirmed prediction. It is most likely that in the coming weeks, the war of attrition will continue on several fronts, with cross-border strikes and a slim chance of an offensive international intervention.

As for Hadhramout, the most immediate threat to the region is not a ground offensive. Rather, it is drones targeting supply routes in the valley, as occurred in Al-Abr on Al-Wadiah road. Added to this is the resurgence of Al-Qaeda activity along the coast—exposed by Brom airstrike—and increased risks at sea. This is a continuation of what began in August, when Al- Abr and Al-Ruwaik camps were among the first targets of the group. The battle for Al-Jawf appears to be the first line of defense for the governorate, and any government retreat there will quickly affect the valley and Al-Wadiah Port.

Politically, what had seemed unclear in August became clear this month. The changes made by Sheikh Amr Bin Habrish in the leadership of Inclusive Hadhramaut Conference were an early indication of his disagreement with the Supreme Coordinative Council, which withdrew from its preparatory committee before a meeting with Al-Khanbashi in Riyadh resolved the dispute. However, the consensus between the two men remains limited to meetings and statements. Meanwhile, the dissolved Transitional Council remains capable of mobilizing the streets in Mukalla, while the electricity crisis and the issue of contract teachers have put pressure on local authorities throughout the month.

Thus, Hadhramout finds itself caught between two pressures at once: the pressure of war from the outside, and the pressure of a security and service gap from the inside.

The Political Briefing:

The fall of Mokha dominated the political scene in September, reshaping the discourse, alliances, and priorities of all parties. The month’s developments can be analyzed along four sections. First: the legitimate government’s response to the escalation, and how its speech shifted from confidence to justification and then to public mobilization. Second: the regional and international stance on the Houthi group’s attacks on Saudi Arabia. Third: the direct communications between Washington and the Houthi group, and what they mean for the government. Fourth: the situation in Hadhramout and the south, where the Hadrami consensus is gaining ground while the dissolved Transitional Council continues to exert pressure on the streets.

The First Section: the legitimate government’s response to military developments and the declaration of general mobilization

The government began the month with a confident tone. Rashad Al-Alimi, Chairman of the Leadership Council, has warned the Houthi group against misreading the state’s patience, and the Prime Minister pledged to provide support to the forces in Taiz and Al-Hodeidah. Al-Alimi then went a step further, stating that the forces had seized the initiative and were continuing to retake territory. In the same path, the coalition of political parties called for opening all fronts simultaneously, and a broad meeting in Marib urged everyone to rally behind the armed forces.

However, this speech collided with reality just a few days later. As the Houthi group advanced toward Mokha, Al-Alimi told the ambassadors of the sponsoring countries that the group had chosen war and must bear its consequences, and the Leadership Council declared that it would not allow Bab Al-Mandab Strait to be turned into another Strait of Hormuz. After the fall of Mokha, officials used different language to interpret what had happened. Ahmed Bin Dagher said that the loss of Mokha did not mean the end of the war, and that victory was still possible. Leadership Council member Sultan Al-Arada described what had happened as isolated incidents that would not deter the government from liberating Sana’a. The governor of Al-Hodeidah, however, viewed what had happened not as a defeat, but as a deception and a conspiracy.

In the second half of the month, the government shifted from analyzing the defeat to mobilizing support. It announced a campaign to rally popular support for the front lines, and tribal elders from Sana’a called on the people to confront the Houthi group and retake the capital. Al- Alaimi then opened the door for members of the group to return and called on Yemenis to join government forces. At the end of the month, parliament approved general mobilization, and Al- Alaimi directed that the implementation of the resolutions on safe return and mobilization be expedited. Meanwhile, Tariq Saleh appeared in public for the first time since his arrival in Riyadh following the events in Mokha, in a meeting with the commander of the Joint Forces. The meeting conveyed the message that his position within the government camp remained officially unaffected, after weeks of absence during which rumors circulated about his presence in the UAE or Somalia. Through these steps, the government is attempting to compensate for what it has lost on the ground by appealing to social and tribal ties. The decision to ensure a safe return appears to be an attempt to undermine the group’s support base from within.

The Second Section: regional and international consensus against the attacks on Saudi Arabia

The Houthi group’s attacks on southern Saudi Arabia sparked a wave of widespread condemnation within roughly a single day. The Gulf Cooperation Council condemned them and called for a firm international stance, while the Saudi Cabinet described them as a “sinful act of aggression.” The Saudi foreign minister stated that the Houthi group had opened a door for itself that it cannot bear. Washington clearly held Iran responsible for the attacks, and its embassy in Yemen stated that the Houthi group was the one that started the conflict. Notably, Russia joined this stance, describing the attacks as unacceptable and harmful to the global economy.

The Arab League had previously adopted a draft resolution in support of Yemen’s sovereignty. The issue was then referred to the Security Council, which held two emergency sessions: the first at the request of Bahrain and the United Kingdom following the attacks on Saudi Arabia, and the second regarding the risks of escalation in Bab Al-Mandab Strait. During the first session, the UN envoy stated that the question was no longer: “Will the war return?” but rather, ‘How will the world deal with a phase even more dangerous than that?’ On the military front, Reuters revealed coordination between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey to respond to the attacks; subsequently, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan announced his country’s readiness to discuss Saudi Arabia’s military needs. As for the Yemeni government, it turned to Cairo, warning that the escalation on the western coast threatens both Bab Al-Mandab Strait and Suez Canal.

The Third Section: the direct channel between Washington and the Houthi group

This month revealed a dual U.S. approach toward the Houthi group. At the beginning of the month, Congress held a session in which there was consensus on dismantling the group’s infrastructure and supporting the legitimate government. However, President Donald Trump revealed a few days later that the Houthi group had reached out to his administration, stating that it did not want to fight the United States and asking it not to intervene. His vice president then confirmed that there was direct communication with the group, explaining that what matters to Washington is the security of navigation in the Red Sea. A third confirmation came from the group itself when its leader, Mohammed Al-Bukhaiti, acknowledged the existence of these communications.

In response, the government intensified its communications with Washington to counterbalance this breakthrough. Al-Alaimi asked Trump for U.S. support to confront the Houthi group, and Leadership Council member Abdullah Al-Alaimi discussed with a U.S. lawmaker ways to bolster the government’s capabilities. Washington was not alone in this dual-track approach. The Russian ambassador held an online meeting with a Houthi leader to discuss developments in Mokha and Bab Al-Mandab Strait; subsequently, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated his country’s support for the Yemeni government and the country’s unity.

The Fourth Section: Hadhramout, the south, the Hadhrami consensus, and pressure from the dissolved transitional council

The month began in Hadhramout with a direct challenge to local authority. The dissolved Transitional Council mobilized its supporters in central Mukalla near the governor’s palace on the anniversary of the founding of the Southern Army, coinciding with a similar rally in Aden where one of its leaders threatened to besiege Al-Ma’ashiq Palace. Reports indicated that security forces arrested a number of participants in Mukalla and raided the homes of council leaders. Days later, members of the council besieged the Education Office in Aden in protest against the display of photos of Aidrous al-Zubaidi.

Meanwhile, Al-Khanbashi met in Riyadh with Sheikh Amr Bin Habrish, head of Hadhramout Tribes Confederacy. The meeting followed a dispute over the formation of the Supreme Coordinative Council of Hadrami Components, after which Bin Habrish has left from its preparatory committee. At the conclusion of the meeting, both parties affirmed their commitment to unity and to strengthening Hadhramout’s presence in national affairs.

This meeting carries significance that goes beyond its ceremonial nature. Al-Khanbashi currently holds membership in the Leadership Council, leads the local authority, and chairs the Coordinative Council, while Bin Habrish leads one of the most prominent organized tribal forces in the governorate. Their agreement fills a gap that the dissolved Transitional Council could have exploited. However, this consensus remains limited to meetings and statements and has not yet been translated into a clear framework for shared decision-making. As for the Transitional Council’s actions, they reveal that while it has lost military control, it remains capable of mobilizing the public. Therefore, political stability in the governorate depends more on the local authority’s performance in delivering services than on understandings among the elites.

Key indicators of political monitoring: