Executive Summary:
In October, the war entered a new phase. Following the loss of the western coast in September, the government, with the support of the coalition, launched Operation “Fajr Al- Yemen”, and its forces shifted from defense to offense on several fronts. In the operation’s early days, the government announced the recapture of Bab Al-Mandab, Dhubab, and Mokha, then advanced south of Marib and into the countryside around Taiz, while airstrikes hit Sana’a for the first time since the escalation began. In response, the Houthi group tightened its siege on Taiz and shifted its strikes to the liberated cities and deep into Saudi territory—from Ma’ashiq Palace in Aden and Al-Rayyan Airport to Riyadh Airport.
On the political front, the government made the designation of the Houthi group as a terrorist organization the centerpiece of its foreign policy, finding support in the Gulf and Europe—support that is expected to be formalized at next month’s session to renew UN sanctions. As for Riyadh, it pursued two parallel tracks: it engaged in joint defense with its partners in Mecca Alliance and, at the same time, opened a channel of dialogue with Tehran, while Washington signaled its willingness to participate in strikes against the group without formally announcing a decision to do so.
Civilians in Taiz have paid the heaviest price, after the group blocked the flow of water and gas into the city, causing fuel and food prices to skyrocket; the human rights center “154” documented 154 civilian casualties in the governorate during the month. The number of displaced persons since August has reached about “260,000”—two hundred sixty thousand—people, nearly half of whom are from Taiz, with cholera cases on the rise in the camps. Economically, the government has shifted the conflict to target the group’s resources, as the Central Bank froze the assets of “135” one hundred thirty-five people, one entity, and one ship linked to the group, while Saudi and international support for service projects continues.
The data indicates that the battle is likely to continue. The defense minister says the operation is still in the first of six phases, tribes are calling for mobilization in Marib, and army statements report that more than “16,000”—sixteen thousand—Houthi fighters have been neutralized. Furthermore, the siege of Taiz remains in place, and battles are ongoing to clear near Bab Al-Mandab; therefore, it seems most likely that fighting will continue on several fronts, with Taiz remaining the most critical test of the operation.
In Hadhramout, however, the nature of the threat has changed. In September, the threat came in the form of drones, but in October, strikes reached Mukalla itself, targeting Al-Rayyan Airport for the fourth time. Nevertheless, the governorate played an important role: the airport received flights diverted from Aden; the people of Hadhramout donated blood for the wounded at Al-Alam Camp in Shabwah; and the transfer of “1,324” security and police personnel to Al-Wadi was completed.
Politically, the events of September carried over into October. After the meeting between Al-Khanbashi and Bin Habrish resolved the dispute over the Supreme Coordinating Council, the rivalry shifted to Hadhramout’s representation on the southern political scene. The dissolved Transitional Council has mobilized its supporters in Mukalla and Seiyun, and Al-Zubaidi reemerged, while Fadi Ba’oum returned to Mukalla with a conciliatory message and met with Al- Khanbashi. Thus, next month, Hadhramout will find itself caught between external pressure in the form of Houthi strikes, internal pressure stemming from the competition over its representation, and the domestic gas crisis.

The Political Briefing:
Two interrelated issues came to the fore this month on the political front: The first is the government’s handling of the conflict after the Houthi group expanded its attacks to Al-Ma’ashiq Palace in Aden and tightened its siege on Taiz. The second is the course Riyadh will take—between deterrence and negotiation—after the group struck Riyadh Airport more than once. This month’s developments can be analyzed along four sections. First: the government’s continuation of Fajr Al- Yemen Operation and its efforts to turn the siege of Taiz into an international issue. Second: the campaign to designate the group as a terrorist organization. Third: Saudi Arabia’s dual approach—balancing deterrence with the Iranian channel—amid Washington’s hesitation. Fourth: Hadhramout and the south, where Al-Zubaidi has reemerged and various factions are vying for representation in the governorate.
The First Focus Area: The Continuation of Fajr Al- Yemen Operation and the Internationalization of Taiz Siege
Fajr Al-Yemen Operation remained the focus of official speech throughout the month. In the middle of the month, Rashad Al-Alimi, Chairman of the Leadership Council, pledged to continue the operation despite what he described as temporary changes on the ground, signaling that the government views fluctuations on the battlefield as part of a protracted struggle. Then came the missile and drone attacks on Al-Ma’ashiq Palace in Aden, which resulted in casualties among the security personnel. Al-Alimi ordered a response against the sources of the threat and announced that the operation had surpassed “17,000”—seventeen thousand—strikes, and the government pledged to continue its work from Aden. In his meeting with the acting head of the U.S. Embassy, Al-Alimi presented the operation as a project to protect the population and restore services, not merely as a military operation. He then reiterated that the attacks on airports would not halt the battle to restore the state.
Meanwhile, Taiz has become the government’s top political priority. Its governor issued an urgent appeal to break the siege, and the governorate’s political parties called for mobilization and urged people to rally behind the army and the resistance. The prime minister then described the siege and the targeting of civilians as war crimes that warrant accountability, and the government called on the Security Council to take urgent action to lift it. The European Union joined this call by urging the group to open supply routes, while local authorities and the people of the governorate called on the group to withdraw unconditionally.
Thus, over the course of the month, the government managed to both continue military operations and turn the siege of Taiz into an international issue, in which the group bears the burden of targeting civilians before the international community.
The Second Focus Area: Designating the Houthi Group as a Terrorist Organization
The government made the designation of the Houthi group as a terrorist organization the focus of its foreign policy efforts this month. It approved the draft designation, after which Al-Alimi officially requested that the UN Secretary-General support a Security Council resolution that would include the designation, an arms embargo, and the drying up of funding sources. This effort found support in the Gulf and in Europe. The Gulf Ministerial Council called on the international community to implement the arms embargo and designate the group as a terrorist organization, while the European Parliament called for its designation and the freezing of its assets. At the end of the month, Al-Alimi warned Europeans of the cost of delaying this decision.
As for the Security Council, it emphasized the arms embargo on Yemen and support for a political settlement, and the government welcomed its stance on the attacks on its territory and on Saudi Arabia. However, its statement did not include a designation of the group; consequently, the government continued to exert pressure a few days later. The UN sanctions regime against the group expires in the middle of next month, and its previous renewal had passed with Russia and China abstaining from the vote; therefore, the renewal session will be the first real test of this campaign.
The Third Focus Area: Riyadh between deterrence and the Iranian channel; Washington between statements and decisions
As the Houthi group’s attacks on Riyadh Airport continued—with one attack resulting in fatalities and hundreds of injuries—Saudi Arabia escalated its rhetoric. It stated that it would not allow Yemen to be used to threaten its security, and then warned the group of the consequences of its attacks on airports, Mecca, and Medina. On the military front, a trilateral meeting was held in Riyadh with Turkey and Pakistan to discuss the attacks and activate the mutual defense treaty. At the end of the month, the Egyptian parliament authorized President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi to take measures to support Saudi Arabia and defend its territory.
However, Riyadh kept another door open. Pakistan revealed that Tehran had proposed the idea of political engagement with the group and that members of the Mecca Agreement would discuss it. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi then offered his Saudi counterpart to facilitate talks between the Kingdom and the group. Riyadh publicly denied that it had requested any Iranian mediation, but Defense Minister Khalid Bin Salman visited Tehran a few days later, accompanied by the Pakistani army chief and the head of Turkish intelligence. The delegation met with senior Iranian officials during a visit that the Saudi Foreign Ministry said was aimed at de-escalating tensions. The following day, Iranian official Mohsen Rezaei met with the group’s ambassador in Tehran. In response, the Yemeni government clearly stated its position on this course of action, with the foreign minister declaring that the Tehran regime is a party to the war, not a mediator for peace.
In Washington, the situation remained suspended between words and action. Earlier this month, President Donald Trump said that the Saudi-Yemeni military campaign was going well, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that Saudi Arabia and Yemeni forces would not tolerate the group’s presence near Bab Al-Mandab Strait. Following the airport attacks, Trump said he was considering joining Saudi Arabia in striking the group, and Rubio described the attacks as heinous. However, this threat had not turned into an official decision by the end of the month. Thus, Riyadh is pursuing two parallel tracks: military deterrence and dialogue with Tehran. In return, the government is keen to maintain a firm stance toward Tehran and to remain a key player in any de-escalation regarding Yemen.
The Fourth Focus Area: Hadhramout, the south, Al-Zubaidi’s return, and the competition for representation in Hadhramout.
The dissolved Transitional Council returned to the scene this month via Hadhramout. Its committees held a series of meetings in Mukalla and Seiyun to prepare for what it called a “million-strong popular mobilization” on the anniversary of the “14” Revolution on October 14. Then, Aidrous Al-Zubaidi appeared at the same event in his first public appearance since leaving Yemen. He announced a general popular mobilization to defend the South within its pre-unification borders, called on southern tribes to declare a state of mobilization, and included Hadhramout among the governorates where he called for mobilization. He also called on Saudi Arabia and the international community to recognize the constitutional declaration he had issued before his departure, while condemning the Houthi group’s attacks on Saudi Arabia. His appearance sparked outrage among Saudi writers and Twitter users, some of whom accused the UAE of stirring up trouble. On the same day, the transitional president of Shabwah appeared in public accompanied by armed men, despite arrest warrants having been issued for him.
Late last month, Fadi Ba’oum, head of the Political Bureau of the Southern Future Council, returned to Mukalla from Saudi Arabia, where he was greeted at the airport by sheikhs, dignitaries, and tribal and political leaders from the coast and Wadi. He stated that Hadhramout is a fundamental pillar of the southern national fabric, and called for dialogue and reconciliation among southern forces, urging them to unite in the face of the Houthi threat. He also thanked Saudi Arabia for its support. He then met with the governor and Leadership Council member; Salim Al-Khanbashi, along with Council leaders in Mukalla, and emphasized the need to unite efforts in the face of Houthi escalation.
Thus, Hadhramout has become an arena of competition for representing the South following the dissolution of the Transitional Council. Al-Zubaidi is proposing a mobilization parallel to that of the state, with a separatist agenda, while Ba’oum is presenting a conciliatory discourse to which Al-Khanbashi is receptive. However, the inclusion of Hadhramout within the southern framework remains a point of contention with Inclusive Hadhramout Conference, which presents the governorate as an entity with its own distinct identity.